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Abstract
In order to collaborate safely and efficiently, robots need to antici-
pate how their human partners will behave. Some of today’s robots
model humans as if they were also robots, and assume users are
always optimal. Other robots account for human limitations, and
relax this assumption so that the human is noisily rational. Both of
these models make sense when the human receives deterministic
rewards: i.e., gaining either $100 or $130 with certainty. But in real-
world scenarios, rewards are rarely deterministic. Instead, we must
make choices subject to risk and uncertainty—and in these settings,
humans exhibit a cognitive bias towards suboptimal behavior. For
example, when deciding between gaining $100 with certainty or
$130 only 80% of the time, people tend to make the risk-averse
choice—even though it leads to a lower expected gain! In this paper,
we adopt a well-known Risk-Aware human model from behavioral
economics called Cumulative Prospect Theory and enable robots
to leverage this model during human-robot interaction (HRI). In
our user studies, we offer supporting evidence that the Risk-Aware
model more accurately predicts suboptimal human behavior. We
find that this increased modeling accuracy results in safer and more
efficient human-robot collaboration. Overall, we extend existing
rational human models so that collaborative robots can anticipate
and plan around suboptimal human behavior during HRI.
CCS Concepts
•Mathematics of computing→ Probabilistic inference prob-
lems; •Computingmethodologies→Cognitive robotics;The-
ory of mind.
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Figure 1: Robots collaborating with humans that must deal with
risk. (Top)Autonomous car predicting if the humanwill try tomake
the light. (Bottom) Robot arm anticipating which cup the human
will grab. In real world scenarios, people exhibit a cognitive bias to-
wards irrational but Risk-Aware behavior.
1 Introduction
When robots collaborate with humans, they must anticipate how
the human will behave for seamless and safe interaction. Consider a
scenario where an autonomous car is waiting at an intersection (see
top of Fig. 1). The autonomous car wants to make an unprotected
left turn, but a human driven car is approaching in the oncoming
lane. The human’s traffic light is yellow, and will soon turn red.
Should the autonomous car predict that this human will stop—so
that the autonomous car can safely turn left—or anticipate that the
human will try and make the light—where turning left leads to a
collision?
Previous robots anticipated that humans acted like robots, and
made rational decisions to maximize their reward [1, 18, 25, 36,
44, 45]. However, assuming humans are always rational fails to
account for the limited time, computational resources, and noise
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that affect human decision making, and so today’s robots anticipate
that humans make noisily rational choices [13, 17, 32, 37, 47]. Under
this model, the human is always most likely to choose the action
leading to the highest reward, but the robot also recognizes that the
human may behave suboptimally. This makes sense when humans
are faced with deterministic rewards: e.g., the light will definitely
turn red in 5 seconds. Here, the human knows whether or not they
will make the light, and can accelerate or decelerate accordingly. But
in real world settings, we usually do not have access to deterministic
rewards. Instead, we need to deal with uncertainty and estimate
risk in every scenario. Returning to our example, imagine that the
human has a 95% chance of making the light if they accelerate:
success saves some time during their commute, while failure could
result in a ticket or even a collision. It is still rational for the human
to decelerate; however, a risk-seeking user will attempt to make
the light. How the robot models the human affects the safety and
efficiency of this interaction: a Noisy Rational robot believes it
should turn left, while a Risk-Aware robot realizes that the human
is likely to run the light, and waits to prevent a collision.
When robots treat nearby humans as noisily rational, they miss
out on how risk biases human decisions. Instead, we assert
To ensure safe and efficient interaction, robots must recognize
that people behave suboptimally when risk is involved.
Our approach is inspired by behavioral economics, where results
indicate that users maintain a nonlinear transformation between
actual and perceived rewards and probabilities [20, 42]. Here, the
human over- or under-weights differences between rewards, result-
ing in a cognitive bias (a systematic error in judgment) that leads
to risk-averse or risk-seeking behavior. We equip robots with this
cognitive model, enabling them to anticipate risk-affected human
behavior and better collaborate with humans in everyday scenarios
(see Fig. 1).
Overall, we make the following contributions:
Incorporating Risk in Robot Models of Humans.We propose
using Cumulative Prospect Theory as a Risk-Aware model. We
formalize a theory-of-mind (ToM) where the robot models the hu-
man as reacting to their decisions or environmental conditions.
We integrate Cumulative Prospect Theory into this formalism so
that the robot can model suboptimal human actions under risk.
In a simulated autonomous driving environment, our user studies
demonstrate that the Risk-Aware robot more accurately predicts
the human’s behavior than a Noisy Rational baseline.
Determiningwhen toReason aboutRisk.We identify the types
of scenarios where reasoning about risk is important. Our results
suggest that scenarios with close expected rewards is the most
important in determining whether humans will act suboptimally.
Safe and Efficient Collaboration when Humans face Uncer-
tainty.We develop planning algorithms so that robots can leverage
our Risk-Aware human model to improve collaboration. In a col-
laborative cup stacking task, shown on the bottom in Fig. 1, the
Risk-Aware robotic arm anticipated that participants would choose
suboptimal but risk-averse actions, and planned trajectories to
avoid interfering with the human’s motions. Users completed the
task more efficiently with the Risk-Aware robot, and also subjec-
tively preferred working with the Risk-Aware robot over the Noisy
Rational baseline.
This work describes a computationally efficient and empirically
supported way for robots to model suboptimal human behavior by
extending the state-of-the-art to also account for risk. A summary
of our paper, including videos of experiments, can be found here.
2 Related Work
Previous work has shown that robots that successfully predict hu-
mans’ behavior exhibit improved performance inmany applications,
such as assistive robotics [2, 14, 22, 23], motion planning [27, 48],
collaborative games [26], and autonomous driving [3, 38, 39]. One
reason behind this success is that human modeling equips robots
with a theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to attribute a mind to
oneself and others [34, 41]. Devin and Alami [11] showed ToM can
improve performance in human-robot collaboration.
For this purpose, researchers have developed various human
models. In robotics, the Noisy Rational choice model has remained
extremely popular due to its simplicity. Several works in reward
learning [5–7, 9, 32, 37], reinforcement learning [17], inverse rein-
forcement learning [8, 35, 47], inverse planning [4], and human-
robot collaboration [33] employed the noisy rational model for
human decision-making. Other works developed more complex
human models and methods specifically for autonomous driving
[18, 21, 38, 44]. Unfortunately, these models either assume humans
are rational or do not handle situations with uncertainty and risk.
There have been other human models that take a learning-based
approach [30, 31, 43]. While this is an interesting direction, these
methods are usually not very data efficient.
In cognitive science, psychology and behavioral economics, re-
searchers have developed other decision-making models. For ex-
ample, Ordonez and Benson III [28] investigated decision making
under time constraints; Diederich [12] developed a model based on
stochastic processes to model humans’ process of making a selec-
tion between two options, again under a time constraint. Ortega
and Stocker [29] proposed a rationality model based on concepts
from information theory and statistical mechanics to model time-
constrained decision making. Mishra [24] studied decision making
under risk from the perspectives of biology, psychology and eco-
nomics. Halpern et al. [19] modeled the humans as a finite automata,
and Simon [40] developed bounded rationality to incorporate sub-
optimalities and constraints. Evans et al. [16] investigated different
biases humans can have in decision-making. Among all of these
works, Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) [42] remains prominent
as it successfully models suboptimal human decision making under
risk. Later works studied how Cumulative Prospect Theory can be
employed for time-constrained decision making [15, 46].
In this paper, we adopt Cumulative Prospect Theory as an ex-
ample of a Risk-Aware model. We show that it not only leads to
more accurate predictions of human actions, but also increases the
performance of the robot and the human-robot team.
3 Formalism
We assume a setting where a human needs to select from a set of
actions AH . Each action aH ∈ AH may have several possible con-
sequences, where, without loss of generality, we denote the number
of consequences as K . For a given human action aH , we express the
probabilities of each consequence and their corresponding rewards
as a set of pairs:
C(aH ) =
{(
p(1),R(1)H (aH )
)
,
(
p(2),R(2)H (aH )
)
, . . . ,
(
p(K ),R(K )H (aH )
)}
We outline and compare two methods that use C(aH ) to model
human actions: Noisy Rational and Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT) [42]. CPT is a prominent model of human decision-making
under risk [15, 46] and we use it as an example of a Risk-Aware
model. Finally, we describe how we can integrate them into a par-
tially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) formulation of
human-robot interaction.
Noisy Rational Model. According to the noisy rational model,
humans are more likely to choose actions with the highest expected
reward, and are less likely to choose suboptimal actions (i.e., they
are optimal with some noise). The noise comes from constraints
such as limited time or computational resources. For instance, in the
autonomous driving example, Noisy Rational model would predict
the humanwill most likely choose the optimal action and decelerate.
Denoting the expected reward of the human for action aH as
RH (aH ) = p(1)R(1)H (aH ) + p(2)R
(2)
H (aH ) + . . . ,p(K )R
(K )
H (aH ),
the noisy rational model asserts
P(aH ) = exp (θ · RH (aH ))∑
a∈AH exp (θ · RH (a))
, (1)
where θ ∈ [0,∞) is a temperature parameter, commonly referred to
as the rationality coefficient, which controls how noisy the human
is. While larger θ models the human as a better reward maximizer,
setting θ =0means the human chooses actions uniformly at random.
Hence, the Noisy Rational model is simply a linear transforma-
tion of the reward with the rationality coefficient θ ≥ 0, which
makes the transformation monotonically non-decreasing. As the
model does not transform the probability values, it becomes impos-
sible to model suboptimal humans using this approach. The closest
Noisy Rational can get to modeling suboptimal humans is to assign
a uniform probability to all actions.
Risk-Aware Model.We adopt Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
[42] as an example of a Risk-Aware model. According to this model,
humans are not simply Noisy Rational. They may, for example, be
suboptimally risk-seeking or risk-averse. For instance, in the au-
tonomous driving example, human drivers can be risk-seeking and
try to make the yellow light even though they risk a costly collision.
The Risk-Aware model captures suboptimal decision-making by
transforming both the probabilities and the rewards. These trans-
formations aim to represent what humans actually perceive. The
reward transformation is a pairwise function:
v(R) =
{
Rα if R ≥ 0
−λ(−R)β if R < 0 .
The parameters α , β ∈ [0, 1] represent how differences among re-
wards are perceived. For instance, when α , β ∈ (0, 1), the model
predicts that humans will perceive differences between large posi-
tive (or negative) rewards as relatively lower than the differences
between smaller positive (resp. negative) rewards, even though the
true differences are equal. λ ∈ [0,∞) characterizes how much more
(or less) important negative rewards are compared to positive re-
wards. When λ > 1, humans are modeled as loss-averse, assigning
more importance to losses compared to gains. The reverse is true
when λ ∈ [0, 1).
The Risk-Aware model also implements a transformation over
the probabilities. The probabilities (p(1),p(2), . . . ) are divided into
two groups based on whether their corresponding true rewards are
positive or negative. The probability transformations corresponding
to positive and negative rewards (w+,w−) are as follows:
w+(p) = p
γ
(pγ + (1 − p)γ )1/γ , w
−(p) = p
δ
(pδ + (1 − p)δ )1/δ ,
where γ ,δ ∈ [0, 1].
Without loss of generality, we assume that each of theK rewards
are ordered in decreasing order, i.e. R(i+1)H (a) ≤ R
(i)
H (a) for all i ∈{1, 2, . . . ,K − 1} and a ∈ AH . Then, the probability transformation
is as follows:
π (C(aH )) =
(
π+(C(aH )),π−(C(aH ))
)
π+(C(aH )) =
(
w+
(
p(1)
)
,w+
(
p(1) + p(2)
)
−w+
(
p(1)
)
, . . .
)
π−(C(aH )) =
(
. . . ,w−
(
p(K )+p(K−1)
)
−w−
(
p(K )
)
,w−
(
p(K )
))
Finally, we normalize probabilities so that π (C(aH )) sums to 1:
π j (C(aH )) =
πj (C(aH ))∑K
i=1 πi (C(aH )))
,∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
When γ ,δ ∈ (0, 1), the probability transformations capture bi-
ases humans are reported to have [42] by overweighting smaller
probabilities and underweighting larger probabilities.
Based on these two transformations, we now extend the human
decision making model with the Risk-Aware model:
RCPTH (aH )=π 1(C(aH )) · v
(
R
(1)
H (aH )
)
+. . .+ πK (C(aH )) · v
(
R
(K )
H (aH )
)
P(aH ) =
exp
(
θ · RCPTH (aH )
)
∑
a∈AH exp
(
θ · RCPTH (a)
) . (2)
In contrast to the Noisy Rational model, the Risk-Aware model’s
expressiveness allows it to model both optimal and suboptimal
human decisions by assigning larger likelihoods to those actions.
Formal Model of Interaction. We model the world where both
the human and the robot take actions as a POMDP, which we
denote with a tuple ⟨S,O,O,AH ,AR ,T , rH , rR ⟩. S is the finite set
of states; O is the set of observations;O : S → O defines the shared
observation mapping;AH andAR are the finite action sets for the
human and the robot, respectively;T : S×AH ×AR ×S → [0, 1] is
the transition distribution. rH and rR are the reward functions that
depend on the state, the actions and the next state. In this POMDP,
we assume the agents act simultaneously. Having a first-order ToM,
the human tries to optimize her own cumulative reward given an
action distribution for the robot, P(aR |s). The human value function
VH (s) can then be defined using the following Bellman update:
VH (s) = max
aH ∈AH
EaR |sEs ′ |s,aH ,aR
[
RH (s,aH ,aR , s ′) + γVH (s ′)
]
.
We then use the fact that
P(s, s ′,aR | o,aH ) = P(s | o) · P(aR | s) · P(s ′ | s,aH ,aR )
to construct a set C(aH ) for the current observation o that consists
of the pairs (P(s, s ′,aR | o,aH ),VH (s ′)) for varying s , s ′, and aR .
Table 1: Autonomous Driving. Users were given different amounts
of information about the likelihood that the light would turn red.
Under risk, we list two tested probabilities of the light turning red.
Information Time
None: With some probability Timed: 8 s
the light will turn red. Not Timed: no limit
Explicit: There is a 5% chance
the light will turn red. Risk
Implicit: Of the previous 380 cars High: 95%
that decided to accelerate, Low: 5%
the light turned red for 19 cars.
When modeling the human as zeroth-order ToM, P(aR | s) will
simply be a uniform distribution.
Having constructed C(aH ), we can define the human’s utility
function for different values of s , and s ′. The utility functions for
both Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware models are defined as follows:
Noisy Rational:
RH (o,aH ) =
∑
s,s ′∈S
∑
aR ∈AR
P(s, s ′,aR | o,aH ) ·VH (s ′) .
Risk-Aware:
RCPTH (o,aH ) =
∑
s,s ′∈S
∑
aR ∈AR
π¯i (P(s, s ′,aR | o,aH )) · v
(
VH (s ′)
)
,
where the index i corresponds to the event that leads to s ′ from
s with aR , aH . An optimal human would always pick the action
aH that maximizes Es |oEaR |sEs ′ |s,aH ,aR [VH (s ′)]. The robot can
obtain P(aH |o) using Eqn. (1), Eqn. (2) and use it to maximize its
own cumulative reward.
Summary. We have outlined two ways in which we can model
humans (Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware), and how we can formalize
these models in a human-robot interaction setting. In the following
section, we empirically analyze factors that allow the Risk-Aware
robot to more accurately model human actions.
4 Autonomous Driving
In our first user study, we focus on the autonomous driving scenario
from the bottom of Fig. 1. Here the autonomous car—which wants
to make an unprotected left turn—needs to determine whether the
human-driven car is going to try to make the light. We asked hu-
man drivers whether they would accelerate or stop in this scenario.
Specifically, we adjusted the information and time available for the
human driver to make their decision. We also varied the level of risk
by changing the probability that the light would turn red. Based on
the participant’s choices in each of these cases, we learned Noisy
Rational and Risk-Aware human models. Our results demonstrate
that autonomous cars that model humans as Risk-Aware are bet-
ter able to explain and anticipate the behavior of human drivers,
particularly when drivers make suboptimal choices.
Experimental Setup.Weused the driving example shown in Fig. 1.
Human drivers were told that they are returning a rental car, and
are approaching a light that is currently yellow. If they run the red
light, they have to pay a $500 ticket. But stopping at the light will
prevent the human from returning their rental car on time, which
also has an associated fine! Accordingly, the human drivers had to
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Figure 2: Action distributions for human drivers. Across all sur-
veyed factors (information, time, and risk), more users preferred to
stop at the light. Interestingly, stopping was the suboptimal choice
when the light rarely turns red (Low).
decide between accelerating (and potentially running the light) or
stopping (and returning the rental car with a fine).
Independent Variables. We varied the amount of information
and time that the human drivers had to make their decision. We
also tested two different risk levels: one where accelerating was
optimal, and one where stopping was optimal. Our parameters for
information, time, and risk are provided in Table 1.
Information. We varied the amount of information that the driver
was given on three levels: None, Explicit, and Implicit. Under None,
the driver must rely on their own prior to assess the probability that
the light will turn red. By contrast, in Explicit we inform the driver
of the exact probability. Because probabilities are rarely given to us
in practice, we also tested Implicit, where drivers observed other
peoples’ experiences to estimate the probability of a red light.
Time. We compared two levels for time: a Timed setting, where
drivers had to make their choice in under 8 seconds, and a Not
Timed setting, where drivers could deliberate as long as necessary.
Risk.We varied risk along two levels: High and Low. When the risk
was High, the light turned red 95% of the time, and when risk was
Low, the light turned red only 5% of the time.
Participants and Procedure. We conducted a within-subjects
study on Amazon Mechanical Turk and recruited 30 participants.
All participants had at least a 95% approval rating and were from the
United States. After providing informed consent, participants were
first given a high-level description of the autonomous driving task
and were shown the example from Fig. 1. In subsequent questions,
participants were asked to indicate whether they would accelerate
or stop. We presented the Timed questions first and the Not Timed
questions second. For each set of Timed and Not Timed questions,
we presented questions in the order of their informativeness from
None to Explicit. The risk levels were presented in random order 1.
Dependent Measures. We aggregated the user responses into
action distributions. These action distributions report the percentage
of human drivers who chose to accelerate and stop under each
treatment level. Next, we learned Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware
models of human drivers for the autonomous car to leverage2. To
1To learn more about our study, please check out our autonomous driving survey link:
https://stanfordgsb.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_cUgxaZIvEkdb3ud
2To learn the models, we used the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm [10] and obtained
30 independent samples of the model parameters.
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Figure 3: Averaged probability and reward transformations for human drivers that are modeled as Noisy Rational or Risk-Aware. In scenarios
where the light frequently turns red (High), both models produce similar transformations. But when the light rarely turns red (Low), the
models diverge: here the Risk-Aware autonomous car recognizes that human drivers overestimate both the probability that light will turn
red and the cost of running the light. This enables Risk-Aware autonomous cars to explain why human drivers prefer to stop, even though
accelerating is the optimal action when the light rarely turns red.
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Figure 4: Model accuracy (lower is better). When the light often
turns red (High), both models could anticipate the human’s behav-
ior. But when the light rarely turns red (Low), only the Risk-Aware
autonomous car correctly anticipated that the human would stop.
measure the accuracy of these models, we compared the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the true action distribution and
the model’s predicted action distribution. We report the log KL
divergence for both Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware models.
Hypothesis.
H1. Autonomous cars which use Risk-Aware models
of human drivers will more accurately predict human
action distributions than autonomous cars who treat
humans as noisily rational agents.
Baseline. In order to confirm that our users were trying to make
optimal choices, we also queried the human drivers for their pre-
ferred actions in settings where the expected rewards were far apart
(e.g., where the expected reward for accelerating was much higher
than the expected reward for stopping). In these baseline trials,
users overwhelmingly chose the optimal action (93% of trials).
Results. The results from our autonomous driving user study are
summarized in Figs. 2, 3, and 4. In each of the tested situations, most
users elected to stop at the light (see Fig. 2). Although stopping
at the light is the optimal action in the High risk case—where the
light turns red 95% of the time—stopping was actually suboptimal
in the Low risk case—where the light only turns red 5% of the
time. Because humans chose optimal actions in some cases (High
risk) and suboptimal actions in other situations (Low risk), the
autonomous car interacting with these human drivers must be able
to anticipate both optimal and suboptimal behavior.
In cases where the human was rational, autonomous cars learned
similar Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware models (see Fig. 3). However,
the Risk-Aware model was noticeably different in situations where
the human was suboptimal. Here autonomous cars using our for-
malism learned that human drivers overestimated the likelihood
that the light would turn red, and underestimated the reward of
running the light. Viewed together, the Risk-Aware model suggests
that human drivers were risk-averse when the light rarely turned
red, and risk-neutral when the light frequently turned red.
Autonomous cars using our Risk-Averse model of human drivers
were better able to predict how humans would behave (see Fig. 4).
Across all treatment levels, Risk-Averse attained a log KL divergence
of −5.7 ± 3.3, while Noisy Rational only reached −3.3 ± 1.3. This
difference was statistically significant (t(239) = −11.5, p < .001).
Breaking our results down by risk, in the High case both models
were similarly accurate, and any differences were insignificant
(t(119) = .42, p = .67). But in the Low case—where human drivers
were suboptimal—the Risk-Aversemodel significantly outperformed
the Noisy Rational baseline (t(119) = −17.3, p < .001).
Overall, the results from our autonomous driving user study
support hypothesis H1. Autonomous cars leveraging a Risk-Aware
model were able to understand and anticipate human drivers both
in situations where the human is optimal or suboptimal, while
the Noisy Rational model could not explain why the participants
preferred to take a safer (but suboptimal) action.
Follow-up:DisentanglingRisk and SuboptimalDecisions.Af-
ter completing our user study, we performed a simulated experi-
ment within the autonomous driving domain. Within this experi-
ment, we fixed the probability that the light would turn red, and
then varied the human driver’s action distribution. When fixing
the probability, we used the High risk scenario where the optimal
decision was to stop. The purpose of this follow-up experiment
was to make sure that our model can also explain suboptimally
aggressive drivers, and to ensure that our results are not tied to the
Low risk scenario. Our simulated results are displayed in Fig. 5. As
before, when the human driver chose the optimal action, both Noisy
Rational and Risk-Aware models were equally accurate. But when
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Figure 5:Model accuracy (lower is better) on simulated data.We sim-
ulated a spectrum of human action distributions in scenarios where
the light often turns red (High risk). The optimal action here is to
stop. As the human becomes increasingly optimal, both Noisy Ra-
tional and Risk-Aware provide a similarly accurate prediction. But
when the human is suboptimal—accelerating through the light—the
Risk-Aware autonomous car yields a more accurate prediction.
the human behaved aggressively—and tried to make the light—only
the Risk-Aware autonomous car could anticipate their suboptimal
behavior. These results suggest that the improved accuracy of the
Risk-Aware model is tied to user suboptimality, and not to the par-
ticular type of risk (either High or Low).
Summary. We find supporting evidence that Risk-Aware is more ac-
curate at modeling human drivers in scenarios that involve decision
making under uncertainty. In particular, our results suggest that
the reason why Risk-Aware is more effective at modeling human
drivers is because humans often act suboptimally in these scenarios.
When humans act rationally, both Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware
autonomous cars can understand and anticipate their actions.
5 Collaborative Cup Stacking
Within the autonomous driving user studies, we demonstrated that
our Risk-Aware model enables robots to accurately anticipate their
human partners. Next, we want to explore how our formalism
leverages this accuracy to improve safety and efficiency during HRI.
To test the usefulness of our model, we performed two user studies
with a 7-DoF robotic arm (Fetch, Fetch Robotics). In an online user
study, we verify that the Risk-Aware model can accurately model
humans in a collaborative setting. In an in-person user study, the
robot leverages Risk-Aware and Noisy Rational models to anticipate
human choices and plan trajectories that avoid interfering with
the participant. Both studies share a common experimental setup,
where the human and robot collaborate to stack cups into a tower.
Experimental Setup.The collaborative cup stacking task is shown
in Fig. 1 (also see the supplemental video). We placed five cups on
the table between the person and robot. The robot knew the location
and size of the cups a priori, and had learned motions to pick up
and place these cups into a tower. However, the robot did not know
which cups its human partner would pick up.
The human chooses their cups with two potential towers in
mind: an efficient but unstable tower, which was more likely to
fall, or a inefficient but stable tower, which required more effort
to assemble. Users were awarded 20 points for building the stable
tower (which never fell) and 105 for building the unstable tower
(which collapsed 80% of the time). Because the expected utility of
building the unstable tower was higher, our Noisy Rational baseline
anticipated that participants would make the unstable tower.
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Figure 6: Results from online and in-person user studies during the
collaborative cup stacking task. (Left) Although building the unsta-
ble tower was optimal, more participants selected the stable tower.
(Right) Model accuracy, where lower is better. TheRisk-Aware robot
was better able to predict which cups the human would pick up.
Independent Variables.We varied the robot’s model of its human
partner with two levels: Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware. The Risk-
Aware robot uses our formalism from Section 3 to anticipate how
humans make decisions under uncertainty and risk.
5.1 Anticipating Collaborative Human Actions
Our online user study extended the results from the autonomous
driving domain to this collaborative cup stacking task. We focused
on how accurately the robot anticipated the participants’ choices.
Participants and Procedure.We recruited 14 Stanford affiliates
and 36 Amazon Mechanical Turkers for a total of 50 users (32%
Female, median age: 33). Participants from Amazon Mechanical
Turk had at least a 95% approval rating and were from the United
States. After providing informed consent, each of our users an-
swered survey questions about whether they would collaborate
with the robot to build the efficient but unstable tower, or the ineffi-
cient but stable tower. Before users made their choice, we explicitly
provided the rewards associated with each tower, and implicitly
gave the probability of the tower collapsing. To implicitly convey
the probabilities, we showed videos of humans working with the
robot to make stable and unstable towers: all five videos with the
stable tower showed successful trials, while only one of the five
videos with the unstable tower displayed success. After watching
these videos and considering the rewards, participants chose their
preferred tower type 3.
Dependent Measures.We aggregated the participants’ decisions
to find their action distribution over stable and unstable towers. We
fit Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware models to this action distribution,
and reported the log KL divergence between the actual tower choices
and the choices predicted by the models.
Hypotheses.
H2. Risk-Aware robots will better anticipate which tower
the collaborative human user is attempting to build.
Results. Our results from the online user study are summarized
in Fig. 6. During this scenario—where the human is collaborating
with the robot—we observed a bias towards risk-averse behavior.
Participants overwhelmingly preferred to build the stable tower
(and take the guaranteed reward), even though this choice was
suboptimal. Only the Risk-Aware robot was able to capture and
3To learn more about our study please check out our cup stacking survey link: https:
//stanfordgsb.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0oz1Y04mQ0s3i7P
Figure 7: Example robot and human behavior during the collaborative cup stacking user study. At the start of the task, the human reaches for
the orange cup (the first step towards a stable tower). When the robot models the human as a Noisy Rational partner (top row), it incorrectly
anticipates that the human will build the optimal but unstable tower; this leads to interference, replanning, and a delay. The robot leveraging
our Risk-Aware formalism (bottom row) understands that real decisions are influenced by uncertainty and risk, and correctly predicts that
the human wants to build a stable tower. This results in safer and more efficient interaction, leading to faster tower construction.
predict this behavior: inspecting the right side of Fig. 6, we found
a statistically significant improvement in model accuracy across
the board (t(59) = −21.1, p < .001). Focusing only on the online
users, the log KL divergence for Risk-Aware reached −8.7±3.0, while
Noisy Rational remained at −1.3 ± 0.01 (t(29) = −13.1, p < .001).
Overall, these results match our findings from the autonomous
driving domain, and support hypothesis H2.
5.2 Planning with Risk-Aware Human Models
Having established that the Risk-Aware robot more accurately mod-
els the human’s actions, we next explored whether this difference is
meaningful in practice. We performed an in-lab user study compar-
ing Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware collaborative robots. We focused
on how robots can leverage the Risk-Aware human model to im-
prove safety and efficiency during collaboration.
Participants and Procedure. Ten members of the Stanford Uni-
versity community (2 female, ages 20 − 36) provided informed
consent and participated in this study. Six of these ten had prior
experience interacting with the Fetch robot. We used the same
experimental setup, rewards, and probabilities described at the be-
ginning of the section. Participants were encouraged to build towers
to maximize the total number of points that they earned.
Each participant had ten familiarization trials to practice build-
ing towers with the robot. During these trials, users learned about
the probabilities of each type of tower collapsing from experience.
In half of the familiarization trials, the robot modeled the human
with the Noisy Rational model, and in the rest the robot used the
Risk-Awaremodel; we randomly interspersed trials with each model.
After the ten familiarization trials, users built the tower once with
Noisy Rational and once with Risk-Aware: we recorded their choices
and the robot’s performance during these final trials. The presenta-
tion order for these final two trials was counterbalanced.
Dependent Measures. To test efficiency, we measured the time
taken to build the tower (Completion Time). We also recorded the
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Figure 8: Objective results from our in-lab user study. When par-
ticipants built the tower with the Risk-Aware robot, they completed
the taskmore efficiently (lower Completion Time) and safely (lower
Trajectory Length). Asterisks denote significance (p < .05).
Cartesian distance that the robot’s end-effector moved during the
task (Trajectory Length). Because the robot had to replan longer
trajectories when it interfered with the human, Trajectory Length
was an indicator of safety.
After participants completed the task with each type of robot
(Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware) we administered a 7-point Lik-
ert scale survey. Questions on the survey focused on four scales:
how enjoyable the interaction was (Enjoy), how well the robot un-
derstood human behavior (Understood), how accurately the robot
predicted which cups they would stack (Predict), and how efficient
users perceived the robot to be (Efficient). We also asked partici-
pants which type of robot they would rather work with (Prefer)
and which robot better anticipated their behavior (Accurate).
Hypotheses.
H3. Users interacting with the Risk-Aware robot will
complete the task more safely and efficiently.
H4. Users will subjectively perceive the Risk-Aware ro-
bot as a better partner who accurately predicts their
decisions and avoids grabbing their intended cup.
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Figure 9: Subjective results from our in-person user study. Higher
ratings indicate agreement (i.e., more enjoyable, better understood).
Here ∗∗ denotes p < .07, and ∗ denotes p < .05. Participants
perceived the Risk-Aware robot as a more efficient teammate, and
marginally preferred collaborating with the Risk-Aware robot.
Results - Objective.We show example human and robot behavior
during the in-lab collaborative cup stacking task in Fig. 7. When
modeling the human as Noisy Rational, the robot initially moved to
grab the optimal cup and build the unstable tower. But in 75% of
trials participants built the suboptimal but stable tower! Hence, the
Noisy Rational robot often interfered with the human’s actions. By
contrast, the Risk-Aware robot was collaborative: it correctly pre-
dicted that the human would choose the stable tower, and reached
for the cup that best helped build this tower. This led to improved
safety and efficiency during interaction, as shown in Fig. 8. Users
interacting with the risk-aware robot completed the task in less
time (t(9) = 2.89, p < .05), and the robot partner also traveled a
shorter distance with less human interference (t(9) = 2.24, p < .05).
These objective results support hypothesis H3.
Results - Subjective.We plot the user’s responses to our 7-point
surveys in Fig. 9. We first confirmed that each of our scales (Enjoy,
Understood, etc.) was consistent, with a Cronbach’s alpha > 0.9. We
found that participants marginally preferred interacting with the
Risk-Aware robot over the Noisy Rational one (t(9) = 2.09, p < .07).
Participants also indicated that they felt that they completed the
task more efficiently with the Risk-Aware robot (t(9) = 3.01, p <
.05). The other scales favored Risk-Aware, but were not statistically
significantly. Within their comments, participants noticed that the
Noisy Rational robot clashed with their intention: for instance, “it
tried to pick up the cup I wanted to grab”, and “the robot picked the
same action as me, which increased time”. Overall, these subjective
results partially support hypothesis H4.
Summary. Viewed together, our online and in-lab user studies
not only extended our autonomous driving results to a collaborative
human-robot domain, but they also demonstrated how robots can
leverage our formalism to meaningfully adjust their behavior and
improve safety and efficiency. Our in-lab user study showed that
participants interacting with a Risk-Aware robot completed the task
faster and with less interference. We are excited that robots can
actively use their Risk-Aware model to improve collaboration.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Many of today’s robots model human partners as Noisy Rational
agents. In real-life scenarios, however, humans must make choices
subject to uncertainty and risk—and within these realistic settings,
humans display a cognitive bias towards suboptimal behavior. We
adopted Cumulative Prospect Theory from behavioral economics
and formalized a human decision-making model so that robots can
now anticipate suboptimal human behavior. Across autonomous
driving and collaborative cup stacking environments, we found that
our formalism better predicted user decisions under uncertainty.We
also leveraged this prediction within the robot’s planning frame-
work to improve safety and efficiency during collaboration: our
Risk-Aware robot interfered with the participants less and received
higher subjective scores than the Noisy Rational baseline. We want
to emphasize that this approach is different from making robots
robust to human mistakes by always acting in a risk-averse way.
Instead, when humans prefer to take safer but suboptimal actions,
robots leveraging our formalism understand these conservative
humans and increase overall team performance.
Limitations and Future Work. A strength and limitation of our
approach is that the Risk-Aware model introduces additional pa-
rameters to the state-of-the-art Noisy Rational human model. With
these additional parameters, robots are able to predict and plan
around suboptimal human behavior; but if not enough data is avail-
able when the robot learns its human model, the robot could overfit.
We point out that for all of the user studies we presented, the
robots learned Noisy Rational and Risk-Aware models from the
same amount of user data.
When learning and leveraging these models, the robot must also
have access to real-world information. Specifically, the robot must
know the rewards and probabilities associated with the human’s
decision. We believe that robots can often obtain this information
from experience: for example, in our collaborative cup stacking task,
the robot can determine the likelihood of the unstable tower falling
based on previous trials. Future work must consider situations
where this information is not readily available, so that the robot can
identify collaborative actions that are robust to errors or uncertainty
in the human model.
Finally, we only tested the Risk-Aware model in bandit settings
where the horizon is 1. Ideally, we would want our robots to be able
to model humans over longer horizons. We attempt to address part
of this limitation by conducting a series of experiments in a grid
world setting with a longer horizon. We found that a Risk-Aware
robot can more accurately model a sequence of human actions
as compared to the Noisy Rational robot. Experiment details and
results are further explained in the Appendix.
Collaborative robots need algorithms that can predict and plan
around human actions in real world scenarios. We proposed an
extension of Noisy Rational human models that also accounts for
suboptimal decisions influenced by risk and uncertainty. While user
studies across autonomous driving and collaborate cup stacking
suggest that this formalism improves model accuracy and interac-
tion safety, it is only one step towards seamless collaboration.
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Appendix
To investigate how well Risk-Aware and Noisy Rational model hu-
mans in more complex POMDP settings, we designed two different
maze games. Each game consists of two 17-by-15 grids and these
two grids have the exact same structure of walls, which are visible
to the player. In each grid, there is one start and two goal squares.
Players start from the same square, and reach either of the goals.
Each square in the grids has an associated reward, which the player
can also observe. The partial observability comes from the rule that
the player does not exactly know which grid she is actually playing
at. While she is in the first grid with 95% probability, there is a 5%
chance that she might be playing in the second grid. We visualize
Figure 11: Log-Likelihood values by Risk-Aware and Noisy Rational
models. One outlier point is excluded from the plot and is shown
with an arrow.
the grids for both games in Fig. 10, and also attach the full mazes
in the supplementary material. We restricted the number of moves
in each game such that the player has to go to the goals with the
minimum possible number of moves. Finally, we enforced a time
limit of 2 minutes per game.
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Figure 10: Summaries of two games. For each game, we have a maze.
The values written on the mazes represent how much reward play-
ers can collect by entering those roads. The first numbers in each
pair correspond to the 95% grid, and the second one to the 5% grid.
We investigate the effect of both risk and time constraints via
this experiment. While it is technically possible for the players to
compute the optimal trajectory that leads to the highest expected
reward, time limitation makes it very challenging, and humans
resort to rough calculations and heuristics. Moreover, we designed
the mazes such that humans can get high rewards or penalties if
they are in the low-probability (5%) grid. This helps us investigate
when humans become risk-seeking or risk-averse.
We recruited 17 users (4 female, 13 male, median age 23), who
played both games. We used one game (two grids) to fit the model
parameters independently for each user, and the other game (other
two grids) to evaluate how well the models can explain the human
behavior. As the human actions depend not only the immediate
rewards, but also the future rewards, we ran value iteration over
the grids and used the values to fit the models as we described in
Sec. 3. We again employed Metropolis-Hastings to sample model
parameters, and recorded the mean of the samples.
Figure 11 shows the log-likelihoods for each individual user
for Risk-Aware and Noisy Rational models. Overall, Risk-Aware
explains the test trajectories better. The difference is statistically
significant (paired t-test, p < 0.05). In many cases, we have seen
risk-averse and risk-seeking behavior from people. For example,
12 out of of 17 users chose the risk-seeking action in the test maze
by trying to get 25 reward with probability 5% instead of getting
2 with 100% probability. Similarly, 15 out of 17 users choose to
guarantee 0.9 reward and gain 0.1 more with 5% probability instead
of guaranteeing 1.6 reward and losing 10 with 5% probability. This
is an example of suboptimal risk-averse action.
